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To Segment or Not to Segment? An Investigation of Segmentation Strategy
Success Under Varying Market Conditions
Sara Dolnicar, Roman Freitag, Melanie Randle

Abstract
A computer simulation study is conducted to explore the interaction of alternative segmentation strategies and the
competitiveness of the market environment, a goal that can neither be tackled by purely analytic approaches as there is
neither sufficient and undistorted real market data available to deduct findings in an empirical manner. The fundamental
idea of the simulation is to increase competition in the artificial marketplace and to study the influence of segmentation
strategy and varying market conditions on organisational success. Success/failure is measured using two performance
criteria: number of units sold and survival of organisations over 36 periods of time. Three central findings emerge: (1)
the more competitive a market environment, the more successful the concentrated market segmentation strategy; (2)
increased levels of marketing budgets do not favour organisations following a concentrated segmentation strategy; and
(3) frequent rethinking and strategy modification impairs organisations that concentrate on target segments.
Keywords: Market segmentation, Market condition influences, Simulation

1. Introduction
Despite wide agreement that strategic marketing forms
the basis of organisational success and the considerable
amount of research that has been conducted over the past
decades in areas of strategic marketing, only limited
work has investigated the interrelations between market
segmentation, product positioning, competition and
success in the marketplace.
The aim of this study is to take one step in the direction
of filling the gap by researching the interplay between
market segmentation strategy and competitive market
conditions, a gap that was specifically identified by
Eliashberg & Chatterjee (1985) and Kuester, Homburg &
Robertson (1999).
We choose a market simulation approach as (1) empirical
data of the experimental or pseudo-experimental nature
required is not available, and (2) economic and gametheoretic analyses are typically limited to very simple,
highly unrealistic settings (for instance, one dimensional
product attribute spaces, uniformly distributed consumer
preferences, rational players). The simulation approach
allows us to investigate selected strategic components
under selected market conditions in a controlled
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experimental setting that is simplified and artificial, but
realistic with respect to the main features under
investigation.
This paper will firstly review prior research in the areas
of market segmentation and competition, from which
three research questions are derived. A computer
simulation based on an artificial market environment
will then be performed to test the three hypotheses and
then, using the pre-determined measures of firm success,
conclusions will be drawn regarding the optimal
strategies for firms operating in markets with varying
levels of competition. Limitations of the study and ideas
for future work are also discussed.
2. Literature Review
Both areas central to the present study, market
segmentation and competition, have been extensively
investigated individually in the past.
Within the field of segmentation research three main
themes can broadly be identified: (1) research aiming at
improving segmentation methodology (Aldenderfer &
Blashfield, 1984; Bailey, 1994; Dolnicar & Leisch, 2000;
Dolnicar & Leisch, 2004; Ketchen & Shook, 1996;
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Krieger & Green, 1996; Lilien & Rangaswamy, 2000;
Mazanec & Strasser, 2000; Milligan & Cooper, 1985;
Milligan, 1981; Myers & Tauber, 1977; Punj & Stewart,
1983; Thorndike, 1953; (2) research comparatively
evaluating the usefulness of different kinds of
segmentation bases (Abbey, 1979; Frank, Massy &
Wind, 1972; Haley, 1968; Wedel & Kamakura, 1998;
Wind, 1978), and (3) empirically based reports on
applied segmentation studies (these segmentation
applications dominate in terms of quantity, a
summarising report including 243 studies of this kind
published in academic journals is provided by Baumann,
(2000) and Dolnicar, (2003).
However, few attempts have been made in the area of
market segmentation research to simultaneously account
for other components of the marketing strategy, as for
instance, the product positioning decision or the
competitive market pressures faced. This research gap
exists both (1) conceptually / methodologically as only
few techniques (see below) have been suggested in the
literature to analyse market data simultaneously to
account for all strategic areas, and (2) empirically, as it is
difficult to collect pseudo-experimental data required to
investigate the effectiveness of different strategies under
different market conditions. The existence of this
research gap implicitly suggests that the target segment
can be chosen without considering the competitive
market environment and the positioning of the own and
all competing brands. Two notable exceptions exist: ideal
point preference mapping (Myers & Tauber 1977, Myers
1996) and perceptions based market segmentation
(Buchta, Dolnicar & Reutterer, 2000; Mazanec &
Strasser, 2000) simultaneously explore positioning,
segmentation and competition issues based on empirical
data. However there is little empirical evidence for
success of certain segmentation strategies under specific
market conditions, evidence that would be of interest to
managers who would get more than purely theoretical
guidance with regard to optimal segmentation strategies
in given market conditions.
The area of competition research is even more extensive
and heterogeneous than segmentation research.
Competition research can broadly be classified into
general approaches studying the issue in an isolated
manner, pure case studies and investigations of
interactions between competition and other aspects of
marketing.

2.1 General Investigations into the Phenomenon of
Competition
Porter (1980) describes different forms of competition in
different market settings and suggests generic strategies
to choose from. Putsis & Dhar (1998) discuss five types
of competitive interaction: cooperative, non-cooperative
and independent (all symmetric), leader-follower and
dominant/fringe firm (asymmetric).
Models of perfect competition focus on the outcome of
competition rather than the actual act of competing and
suggest that perfectly competitive firms operate
independently and without consideration of competitors
(McAfee & McMillan, 1996). Neoclassical economists
believe perfect competition to result in the efficient
allocation of resources and the maximisation of social
welfare (Hunt & Duhan, 2002). Conventional business
theorists however believe that greater competition results
in more effective outcomes because organisations that
are able to operate more effectively and offer customers
more value for money will receive more profits and
flourish (Hunt & Duhan, 2002). Hunt & Duhan (2002)
developed the interdisciplinary resource-advantage
theory which allows firms to act both efficiently, as
suggested by perfect competition and effectively, as
proposed by conventional business wisdom.
Game theory is the dominant paradigm used in
marketing to analyse the interaction between
organisations operating in oligopolistic markets
(Moorthy, 1985; Putsis & Dhar, 1998; Weitz, 1985),
whereby the focus is on the actual act of competing
(McAfee & McMillan, 1996). According to this view the
actions of a firm are at least partly in response to the
other players in the ‘game’, or competitors in the market,
and competition is viewed as a process of decisionmaking that is done in an uncertain environment.
Evolving from game theoretic models have come ‘new
markets’ of competition which allowed decentralised
decision making in situations where it had previously
been done centrally and inefficiently (McAfee &
McMillan, 1996).
In the tradition of exploring competition in an aggregate
manner Urban, Johnson & Hauser (1984) suggest a
quantitative criterion to determine the competitive
market structure as a basis for managerial decision
making, later extended by Novak & Stangor (1987) and
Kannan & Wright (1991). Henderson (1983) lists
fundamental principles for competition analysis deduced
from natural sciences.
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2.2 Case studies based on specific industries
Wesson & De Figueiredo (2001) explore the
microbrewery market and find that aggressive entry is
most successful when no budget constraints are faced
and the degree of focus chosen by the new entrant
significantly influences market success. Smith et al.
(1991) investigate competition in the US domestic airline
market focusing on firms’ responses to competitor
initiatives, later extended by Chen & MacMillan (1992)
who take a more fundamental and game theoretic
approach to competitive response behaviour in the
industry. Clearly the limitations of these studies lie in the
low generalisability.
2.3 Interactions between competition and other aspects
of marketing
Weitz (1985) noted the general lack of research into the
affect of competition intensity on marketing activity.
However in recent decades researchers and managers
have increasingly recognised the importance of
understanding the different types of competition across
categories, marketing instruments and strategic groups
(Putsis & Dhar, 1998). Henderson (1983) notes: ‘the
success of any marketing strategy depends on the strength
of the competitive analysis on which it is based’ (p. 7).
Some theorists have examined the relationship between
competition intensity and the overall marketing mix
(Dutta & King, 1980; Gatignon, Anderson & Helsen,
1989; Hauser & Shugan, 1983; Kotler, 1965; Oxenfeldt
& Moore, 1978; Robinson, 1988). Kotler (1965)
presented a duopolistic dynamic competitive model
which included advertising, distribution and pricing
decisions, while Dutta & King (1980) used ‘metagame’
analysis to develop a framework for competitive strategy
development. Slade (1995) investigated the nature of
competition amongst competing brands by developing a
dynamic model of product rivalry in a market where
organisations have a number of competitive tools
including price and advertising intensity. Carpenter &
Lehmann (1985) used not only the marketing mix
variables but also brand switching and product features
to develop a model to investigate patterns of competition
and market structure.
Although empirical research in the area of market defence
strategies to respond to increasing competition is relatively
thin (Kuester, Homburg & Robertson, 1999) some
researchers have begun to investigate this issue. Perhaps
most significantly, Hauser & Shugan (1983) developed the
‘Defender’ model which provided a framework for how
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firms should modify their marketing mix to respond to
new entrants. The interaction between competition,
positioning and segmentation was further explored by
Hauser (1988) in the extended Defender model where
equilibria conditions were identified and maximum
differentiation was found to maximise profits. Gatignon,
Robertson & Fein (1997) investigate defence strategies for
incumbents facing increased competition in the form of
new entrants and recommends that the response strategy
should include as few elements of the marketing mix as
possible in order to avoid underspending on each element
relative to its marginal utility.
2.3.1 Competition & Positioning
Interaction between positioning and competition was
studied by Hotelling (1929, principle of minimum
differentiation) and d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz & Thisse
(1979, principle of maximum differentiation) focusing
on the case of unidimensional product feature space
including price in a duopoly market setting.
Vandenbosch & Weinberg (1995) extended the one
dimensional Hotelling model to two dimensions, still
assuming uniform distribution of consumer preferences
and looking at the duopoly situation exclusively resulting
in an equilibrium positioning where one attribute is at its
maximum level and the second one at the minimum level
for one firm and exactly the opposite for the competitor.
Carpenter (1989) investigated the same interaction
emphasising organisation’s expenditures for advertising
and distribution, finding that positioning and optimal
marketing mix in terms of these expenditures are highly
dependent. Stearns et al. (1995) studied the effect of
different positioning approaches under varying
competitive market situations using empirical data of
new entrants and found significant interaction with
inconsistent findings for different settings.
2.3.2 Competition & Price
Rao & Shakun (1972) developed a static pricing model
with price as the only decision variable. Others such as
Thompson & Teng (1984) later proposed dynamic
models which consider price as a control variable in
deriving equilibrium strategies. A study by Rao & Bass
(1985) explored how competition influences dynamic
pricing of new products by focusing on the development
of industry pricing in different competitive settings. They
modelled competition as a dynamic Nash equilibrium
and extended analysis of dynamic pricing to an
undifferentiated oligopoly by addressing the problem
analytically, numerically and empirically.
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Ansari, Economides & Ghosh (1994) explored the
interaction of positioning and price in a competitive
environment in a game theoretic manner. They relaxed
the assumption of uniformly distributed consumer
preferences illustrating the difference in results if this
assumption is made. The investigation included
competitive situations with different numbers of
competing firms and found that differentiation reduces
price competition and increases profits, optimal
positions depend on the number of organisations and the
level of consumer heterogeneity. McAfee & McMillan
(1996) also discuss the value of the game-theoretic
approach to marketers and the affect of competition on
product positioning and pricing. They emphasise the
value of creating competition for a new product as an
effective way of ensuring low prices in the longer term.
Ramaswamy, Gatignon & Reibstein (1994) focus on price
and selling and investigate cooperative and retaliatory
competitive strategies, discussing the extent to which
different levels of competition influence marketing
behaviour. Clarke & Dolan (1984) simulate a range of
pricing strategies in a sequential entry context where the
entry date is known, while Spence (1981) also considers
sequential entry in developing a dynamic model of
competition focusing on the issue of declining costs.
2.3.3 Competition & Product
Ballou & Pipkin (1980) developed a framework for
modelling competition and investigated product
positioning strategies in oligopolistic markets that are
highly competitive and uncompetitive. Interaction
between product quality and competition was also
studied by Moorthy (1988) in one dimensional product
attribute space, while McGuire & Staelin (1983) focused
on competition and product substitutability using a linear
duopoly model and established equilibrium conditions
for different channel structures. Lane (1980) investigated
the relationship between product positioning and pricing
and levels of competition in oligopolistic markets with
sequential entry.
2.3.4 Competition & Advertising Expenditure
Friedman (1958) used game theory as a basis for a static
model of advertising expenditure using different
scenarios, which was later developed by Shakun who
introduced interdependencies between segments, and
Gupta & Krishnan (1967) who included multiple
competitors and additional controllable variables.

Schmalensee (1978) proposed a dynamic model of
advertising expenditure in which he recognised the
ongoing nature of advertising decision making. This was
later extended to include finite planning horizons and the
investigation of duopolistic situations for growing and
non-growing markets (Deal, 1979; Erickson, 1985;
Wang & Wu, 2001), and oligopolistic situations with
pricing included as an additional control variable
(Thompson & Teng, 1984).
2.3.5 Competition & Market Segmentation
The interplay between organisational market
segmentation strategy and different competitive market
situations has so far received little attention (Eliashberg
& Chatterjee, 1985), although recommendations for
managerial decision making on a strategic level cannot
be made in an isolated manner.
Lilien & Rangaswamy (2000) introduce the STP
approach, a stepwise procedure integrating segmentation
target choice and positioning in a sequential manner.
Mazanec & Strasser (2000) and Buchta, Dolnicar &
Reutterer (2000) propose and illustrate an integrated
approach of analysis including segmentation, positioning
and competition based on empirical three way data
(PBMS, perceptions based market segmentation).
Wesson & De Figueiredo relate the issues of competition
and market segmentation to each other in a case study,
empirically finding that new entrants into the
microbrewery industry are better off serving small
market segments.
3. Research Questions
The central issue to be investigated in this study is the
interaction between different segmentation strategies and
the level of competition within the market in which a
firm is operating. As opposed to most previous studies
on this interaction, we do not investigate the effects of
market entry (Gatignon, Robertson & Fein, 1997; Hauser
& Shugan, 1983; Lane, 1980; Spence, 1981; Stearns et
al., 1995; Wesson & De Figueiredo, 2001). Three
hypotheses are to be tested in this study.
Firstly, it has been widely postulated that higher levels of
competition favour a concentrated market segmentation
strategy, and although this assumption is not surprising,
there is so far little evidence for this assertion. Prior work
investigating the relationship between competition and
market segmentation strategy have either used economic
approaches making limiting assumptions or of empirical
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approaches and have consequently been limited in their
generalisability. For example Hauser’s study (1988)
demonstrates higher price equilibria for differentiated
product positions. Ansari, Economides & Ghosh (1994)
found that greater heterogeneity in consumer preferences
results in maximum segmentation and differentiation,
increased market share, and less price competition
resulting in higher profits. These investigations,
however, are limited to 2-4 competitors. Wesson & De
Figueiredo (2001), in their empirical study, found an
association of segmentation and success of new entrants.
Stearns et al. (1995) found that new firm survival could
not be predicted by examining an industry in isolation,
but that when the location and strategy of the firm were
also considered survival chances could be predicted. For
example, service industry firms operating in
metropolitan locations were far more likely to succeed if
they pursued a narrow or niche marketing strategy.
Therefore the first hypothesis to be tested is:
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of competition favour a
concentrated market segmentation strategy.
The second hypothesis relates to advertising expenditure
levels. Friedman (1958) studied the interaction of
competitive strategy and advertising expenditure finding
that the optimal advertising expenditure differs for each
firm and is proportional to both the potential sales in the
area and the share of total advertising in the area; and that
when a firm has less advertising funding available than a
competitor it should adopt a mixed strategy, increasing
the probability of reaching any given customer. Shakun’s
study (1965) indicates that the level of advertising
expenditure spent selling the product of one firm
proportionately influences sales of the corresponding
product of the other firm, limiting the investigation to two
competitors only. Gupta & Krishnan (1967) assume
multiple competitors but limit the controllable variables
of the firm to price and promotion, identifying conditions
under which competitors with differing levels of
resources should use price and promotions as their major
competitive tool, depending on their respective resource
levels. The knowledge gap however lies in the
investigation of high levels of advertising expenditure and
the most appropriate segmentation strategy for firms
finding themselves in this position. Therefore, we will be
testing the following assumption.
Hypothesis 2: Higher advertising expenditure levels
favour the concentrated market segmentation strategy
more than the mass marketing strategy.
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To the authors’ knowledge, no prior investigations of
frequency of marketing and segmentation strategy
revision on market performance have been undertaken.
It has been generally postulated, however, that the
periodic reassessment of marketing strategy is a crucial
organisational success factor (Kotler, 1999, 2003;
McDonald, 2002; McDonald & Payne, 1996; Schnaars,
1998). This is because the customisation to the target
group chosen can be optimised steadily. This is
reflected in hypothesis three:
Hypothesis 3: Frequent revision of strategy favours the
concentrated market segmentation strategy.
4. The Simulation Environment: an Artificial
Consumer Market
A market simulation approach has been chosen for this
study primarily due to the unavailability of the
experimental empirical data required. Using a simulation
approach, selected strategic components can be
investigated under specific market conditions in a
controlled setting.
The computer simulation is based on an artificial
consumer market environment (SIMSEG/ACM by
Buchta & Mazanec, 2001; Buchta et al., 2004) that is
outlined in Figure 3. The main purpose of this
environment is to provide a market-like framework,
which supports, ceteris paribus experiments in order to
gain insight on how successful certain corporate
strategies are in a competitive marketplace. The central
research question is formalised within this environment
by constructing artificial actors (agents) that compete
with each other. In the present study, these actors
represent organisations. They are designed to make use
of different decision rules concerning their market
segmentation strategy. The organisations are confronted
with each other and each other’s market strategies in a
marketplace. Over the multiple replications of the
simulation the market conditions are systematically
varied. By simulating a long period of time (three years),
insights are gained about the success of particular
strategies under given circumstances. These conditions
are defined a priori. In this experiment the following
components define the artificial marketplace:
Product: The product consists of 12 attributes that can
be perceived by a customer. These could be associations
that tourists have with destinations (cool, trendy,
relaxing, safe, expensive, etc.) or perceived
characteristics of a car (fast, sexy, fancy, luxurious, etc.).
These 12 attributes are designed to load on four hidden
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dimensions (factors), three attributes per dimension. For
instance, the attributes cool and trendy for tourist
destinations are likely to load on a different underlying
factor than safety. All dimensions represent information
that is purely influenced by advertising action, as the
production is not of fundamental importance for the
question under investigation and was therefore not
modelled in the simulation.
Customers: The world consists of many consumers who
have heterogeneous preferences with regard to the 12
product attributes. Six such market segments are
modelled, the preferences of which are given in Table 1.
Every column represents one hidden dimension (factor),
every row represents one segment. For instance, Factor 1
could represent safety related tourist destination
Table 1: Consumer preference segments
Factor 1
Segment 1
Segment 2
Segment 3
Segment 4
Segment 5
Segment 6

I
R
R
R
I
I

Factor 2 Factor 3
I
R
I
R
I
R

R
I
R
R
I
I

Factor 4
R
I
I
R
I
R

Note: I = irrelevant; R = relevant
perceptions and include three attributes (safety,
familiarity and low crime rate) and Segment 1 could be
the segment of young tourists travelling with friends and
mainly interested in an exiting and adventurous holiday.
Furthermore, Table 1 specifies whether the Factors are
relevant or irrelevant to the segments in the marketplace:
an 'I' indicates that the attributes forming this Factor are
irrelevant to a segment, whereas an 'R' stand for relevant.
Thus, Segment 1 does not care about the first three items
(which could mean that young adventure-seeking tourists
are not evaluating a tourist destination on the basis of the
safety), whereas the information about the last three items
is studied very carefully by this group of customers when
they make a buying decision. The preferences of the
segments remain fixed during the entire simulation.
Segment sizes are unequal (with segment 3 including 50
percent of the customers and every other segment 10
percent). Each customer buys exactly one product in each
period (non-purchase is not an option).

Competitors: Two kinds of organisations compete in the
artificial marketplace where organisational behaviour is
assumed to be bounded rational. The two organisational
prototypes are therefore developed to follow very simple
decision rules.
Mass marketer: They do not construct consumer market
segments. All potential buyers are addressed with the
same advertising message. The mass marketer creates
this message by accentuating product attributes that are
strongly perceived among buyers of the mass marketer’s
product in the past period. The mass marketer thus
assumes a continuing causal relation between attribute
perception and a buying act in the following period. The
functioning of this organisation (the bounded rational
behaviour rule) is outlined in Figure 1.
Segmenter: They create a partition of the consumers’
based on their perception of the own brand. For
advertising message development, the segmenter first
chooses the group of individuals with the highest number
of buying acts in the past period and then affirms
attributes which are perceived by more than 50%. This
message is targeted at all buyers of the own brand. An
outline is provided in Figure 2.
Simulation cycle: One simulation period starts with
organisational decisions that are fed into the artificial
consumer market. These decisions include the
development of the advertising message and the
selection of the market segment to be targeted (in case of
the segmenter). After all computations within the
artificial world are executed (customers match their
preferences with the perceptions of the products in the
marketplace as influenced by advertising action), the
actors receive a summary of market performance
including consumer choices (who bought which
product), and the beliefs or perceptions of the customers
on all 12 product attributes. A summary of the
computations that take place in the SIMSEG simulation
environment is provided in Figure 4.
5. Measures of Organisational Performance
The typical performance measures used in segmentation
studies are profit, sales and market share. In competition
analysis survival dominates the list of criteria explored.
In this article the effect of the strategy-competitioninteraction is investigated for two different performance
measures representing different organisational goals
encountered: the number of units sold is the general
success measure (representing profit and revenues as
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Figure 1: Organisational behaviour under the mass marketing strategy
Select data basis for analysis:
include perception of brands bought only

Determine attributes perceived by the absolute majority:
calculate item perception percentage (IPP, percent of
buyers that perceive each item as existent)

create advertising message:
include attributed with IPP > 50%

does the advertising
message include at least
one attribute
NO

rank order items according to IPP

include attribute with maximum IPP
into advertising message
YES
check range of 5 percent lower IPP
and include up to 5 attributes
(in descending IPP order)
NO
have items been
included

YES
target the derived advertising message
to all customers

well in this particular simulation because the price
module was excluded) and survival representing the
long-term perspective of the organisation.

look at the total units sold. As price is set fixed in our
simulation this would be the equivalent to a sales
criterion as well as a market share indicator.

Number of units sold: The simplest way to measure
success or undertake success comparisons is to take a

Survival: Another common way to evaluate corporate
success in a competitive environment is to monitor
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Figure 2: Organisational behaviour under the segmenter strategy
Select data basis for analysis: clusters perceptions
and chooses segment with maximum choices of own brand

Determine attributes perceived by the absolute majority:
calculate item perception percentage (IPP, percent of
buyers that perceive each item as existent)

create advertising message:
include attributed with IPP > 50%

does the advertising
message include at least
one attribute
NO

rank order items according to IPP
YES
include attribute with maximum IPP
into adverstising message

target the derived advertising message
to customers chosen in the data basis

which companies survive in the long run (Stearns et al.,
1995), an approach very typical for new venture success
investigations. This criterion can be measured in a binary
manner, allowing the conclusion that surviving
companies acted more successfully in the marketplace in
the long run than non surviving companies.
6. Experimental Design
Every simulation has a duration of 36 periods with one
period representing one month. The number of
independent simulations is a result of the full factorial
experimental design based on the following factors and
factor levels:
Advertising budget: low (100) and high (200
monetary units)

Thinking cycle (this is the frequency of the
possibility to revise the strategy): every simulation
period and every 6th simulation period
number of organisation in the marketplace: 2, 3, 5, 7
and 10
Each simulation was repeated ten times. The
experimental design is outlined in Figure 4, providing the
exact mix of mass marketers and segmenters competing
in the marketplace in each scenario.
7. Results
Results based on the number of units sold as the
performance measure: Analyses of variance are
computed assuming a linear model where units sold
function as the dependent variable and the amount of
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Figure 3: Outline of basic SIMSEG/ACM functioning

price

desire

Preference and
desire matching
module
(ideal point model)
Utility calculation
module

advertising
message

advertising
budget

Advertising effect
module (modification
of prior attitude)
Attitude

Brand
choice

Brand
perception

target
segment

advertising budget and the length of the thinking cycle
represent the independent variables. First order
interactions are included. Separate analyses are
computed for each competitive setting (consisting of ten
replications under identical conditions).
Figure 5 illustrates these results visualised by means of
box plots where the top two quadrants show results under
the condition of high marketing budgets and the bottom
quadrants for low marketing budgets. The right hand side
of the plot provides results under the condition that
strategic reorientation of the organisation was possible in
every sixth period, whereas the left hand side allowed
strategy changes in each period.
The major finding that results from the simulations
conducted, is that organisations that choose to segment
the consumers and focus on target markets are more
successful in highly competitive environments; when
two organisations compete (adjusted R squared .88, pvalue < .001), the segmenter is significantly less
successful than the mass marketer. In addition, longer
thinking cycles (every sixth period of time) significantly
favour the performance of the segmenters in highly
competitive environments. The latter effect is caused by
the fact that the segmenter tends to switch market niches
and the advertising profile when the choice of possible
sub markets is large due to low competition.
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In the case of three competing firms (adjusted R squared
.48, p-value < .001) the segmenter performs significantly
worse then the mass marketers, with high budget
additionally decreasing performance level of the
segmenter because mass marketers can more efficiently
advertise to their large number of customers, whereas
segmenters targeting smaller groups of potential buyers
reach saturation levels. The linear model including five
competitors in general does not fit very well (adjusted R
squared .19, p-value < .001). Significance values
indicate that the segmenters’ performance is inferior,
longer thinking cycles favours them while impairing
success of mass marketers. The same is true for the
seven-competitors scenario (adjusted R squared .25, pvalue < .001), supporting the finding that long thinking
cycles are in favour of the segmenter strategy. In the
market with ten competitors (Figure 5) all segmenters
turn out to be significantly more successful. Marketing
budget plays an important role, with higher budgets
impairing the success of segmenters and long thinking
cycles benefiting them.
Results based on the survival performance measure:
Survival was investigated in the last simulation period.
Firms that did not sell any products at all (market share
equals zero) failed to survive in this marketplace. The
results are given in Table 2 where the descriptions of the
scenarios are given in columns 1 and 2. The three right-
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Figure 4: Experimental Factors and Factor Levels
marketing
budget
(2 levels)

thinking cycle
(2 levels)

number of
agents
(5 levels)

100 monetary
units

every period
of time

1 mass marketer
1 segmenter

200 monetary
units

every sixth period
of time

2 mass marketer
1 segmenter
3 mass marketer
2 segmenter
5 mass marketer
2 segmenter

7 mass marketer
3 segmenter

hand columns provide the number of organisations that
did not survive the simulated three-year period of time.
Each of the three columns specifies the number of
competitors these organisations faced. For instance, if
the strategy could be revised each period (thinking cycle
1) and the advertising budget was low (100), 1
organisation died in a highly competitive market and this
was a mass marketer.
It becomes apparent from this table that all firms survive
in the marketplaces with low competition. Both in the
two- and three-competitor-marketplaces all firms
operate and sell their products until the last period of
time simulated. In all simulation runs except for the fivecompetitor-scenario, exclusively mass marketers fail to
survive. As can be seen, more mass marketers are unable
to cope with competition in general (and especially
under the conditions of low advertising budget and long
periods of time without adaptation of the advertising
message and the segment targeted). The reasons are
twofold: First, the mass marketer in general suffers more
from low budgets than the segmenter does (larger
amount of potential buyers the advertising message is
addressed to). Second, mass marketers suffer from the
fact that segmenters perform better when strategic
thinking cycles are longer because the rule of the

segmenter supports rapid change that on the long run
does not optimally influence the advertising
effectiveness and thus the customer perceptions. Exactly
the opposite reasoning explains the one death of a
segmenter in the five-competitors market environment
with high advertising budget and frequent possibility to
change the advertising message.
In sum, three findings can be deduced from investigating
this performance measure: (1) under the market
conditions modelled, non-survival is a rare event in
general, (2) the segmenters beat the mass marketers with
respect to the survival criterion and (3) the more
competitors offer their products in the marketplace, the
higher the probability of firms not surviving the entire
simulation period.
With regard to the proposed research questions, the
simulation results lead to following conclusions:
Hypothesis 1: The concentrated segmentation
strategy is found to be more successful under the
condition of high competition with regard to
organisational performance.
Hypothesis 2: Increased advertising expenditure is
not found to favour the concentrated segmentation
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Figure 5: Box Plot of Simulation Results with 10 Competitors
(mass marketers coded as “1”, “2”, “3”, “4” , “5”, “6” and “7”, segmenters as “8”, “9” and “10”)
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strategy. On the contrary, higher marketing budget
levels for all competitors turn out to significantly
impair the success of segmenters in the case of
number of units sold used as performance measure.
The same is true where the survival criterion is used
instead of the performance measure, although the
contrary effect is not detected.
Hypothesis 3: The opportunity to review the strategy
more frequently does not lead to increased market
success of the segmenter. On the contrary,
segmenters are found to suffer from the multitude of
possible segments when competition is low, for both
performance measures.
In sum, the concentrated segmentation strategy seems to
provide an advantage in a market with high competitive
pressure. Log-file analysis of consecutive periods allows
insight into the market developments in every single
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simulated month over the entire period of the simulation.
The fundamental functioning as extracted is as follows:
Mass marketers advertise the same product attributes,
the attributes perceived most often to apply among the
buyers of the total market. Additional competitors that
act in accordance with the mass marketing rule thus
reduce the market size for this strategy. More
competition among mass marketers only therefore
decreases the number of units sold for all organisations
targeting the entire market. Segmenters that attack mass
marketers by choosing to advertise product attributes
identical or very similar to those promoted by the mass
marketers have stronger advertising effectiveness due to
a smaller group of individuals exposed to the advertising
message. Segmenters that target a niche market and
therefore advertise a product profile that is very distinct
in the marketplace take advantage of the fact that there is
no or very low competition for the product offered. As
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Table 2: Non-survival Results
Thinking cycle

Advertising budget

Scenario
with 10 competitors

Scenario
with 7 competitors

Scenario
with 5 competitors

each period (1)

low (100)

1 (mass marketer)

1 (mass marketer)

0

each period (1)

high (200)

0

0

1 (segmenter)

every sixth period (6)

low (100)

4 (mass marketers)

1 (mass marketer)

0

every sixth period (6)

high (200)

2 (mass marketers)

0

0

long as competition is low, mass marketers beat
segmenters because they influence a large number of
consumer opinions in the favoured product perception
dimensions, whereas the segmenter only influences a
small number, thus generating less buying acts. With
increasing competition the pure size effect vanishes and
the segmenter strategy is more successful due to either
increased advertising effects or niche targeting.
8. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Work
A computer simulation study was conducted
investigating the interaction of alternative segmentation
strategies and the competitiveness of the market
environment. The artificial world that was developed to
represent the aspect of market reality relevant to our
research questions is a mature market (with no new
entries), containing preference segments with fixed
preferences over the entire three simulated years. Each
consumer buys exactly one product a year, advertising
effects are cumulative, but past organisations’ strategy
mistakes cannot not be fed back into future strategy. Two
kinds of organisations compete in the market place: mass
marketers and segmenters. Both follow a simple segment
selection and advertising message development rule and
can occur multiple times in the market.
The following central conclusions can be drawn from the
simulation: (1) the more competitive a market
environment, the more successful the concentrated
market segmentation strategy; (2) increased levels of
marketing budget for all competitors does not favour
segmenters, as they reach advertising effect saturation
levels earlier; (3) frequently rethinking and modifying

the strategy is not recommended for organisations
following a concentrated segmentation strategy because
cumulative advertising effects over multiple periods of
time are not taken advantage of if the target segment is
modified too often.
These findings were based on the analysis of two
different performance measures: the number of units
sold and organisation survival. The latter was found not
to be very informative for this particular experiment, as
the number of organisations not surviving the
simulations was rather low. The number of units sold
served well as performance measure for the simulation
set up.
Within the constraints of simulation experiments, our
study is limited by the following restrictions that were
deliberately excluded from investigation but interesting
for future simulations with different research questions:
(1) price was set equal for all organisations; (2) no agent
memory was modelled (learning from failures in the past
therefore is not possible); (3) consumers in the artificial
world modelled have fixed preferences and therefore do
not change aspiration levels in reaction to market
development and finally; (4) advertising budget levels
were able to be increased for all competing organisations
where, for instance, niche marketers may realistically
have less resources to do this.
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